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It is only in recent years that the use by judges of extrinsic materials has
become an issue openly discussed in Canadian legal periodicals. Chief
Justice Brian Dickson virtually occasioned a debate on the question in a
public address in 1979.1 The Chief Justice said: ". . . the Supreme Court
of Canada recently signalled an increasing receptiveness to the use of
extrinsic materials in the Anti-Inflation Reference. Accordingly, I expect
that we will see an increasing use by appellate courts of extrinsic
evidence". 2 Dickson gave the impression that extrinsic material was not
widely used by Canadian courts prior to the Anti-Inflation case. The
purpose of this paper is to show that one form of extrinsic material -
historical evidence - has long been used with confusing results in
Canadian constitutional cases.
I. What Is and What Is Not History
Those who have taken the trouble to explore the problem of the use of
history by judges usually find that it is not easy to say what specifically
"history" means. For example, the use of precedent in the common law
tradition is an important use of history. The common law judge is
virtually commanded to rummage throughout past cases in aid of his
judgment. And no one would suggest that it was improper for him to do
so. Indeed, counsel at trial will spend most of their energies attempting to
show that the case at bar must be resolved on the authority of a line of
cases stretching back many decades. No common law judge could ignore
the weight of a preponderant line of precedent. It is for this reason that
the common law tradition demands that a judge must give cogent reasons
for departing from precedent. To do so casually would rob the
application of the law of its continuity and hence its legal certainty. This
form of history is then beyond dispute. It is an essential aspect of the
judge's task. This is not to suggest that Canadian courts blindly adhere to
stare decisis. Indeed, the trend in Canada is clearly towards a flexible use
*Department of Political Science, University of Guelph.
1. See eg., WH. Charles, "Extrinsic Evidence and Statutory Interpretation: Judicial
Discretion in Context" (1983), 72 Dalhousie Law Journal 7.
2. "The Role and Function of Judges" (1979), The Law Society Gazette 138 at 163.
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of precedent. 3 The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, "has
explicitly refused to follow a prior (Judicial Committee) decision in
several cases".4
But is that same common law judge permitted to use historical
material relating to the times in which a given statute was enacted as an
aid to understanding the nature of the "mischief' aimed at? Is it proper,
for example, to appeal to the sociological conditions prevalent
throughout Canada at the passage of the Canada Temperance Act as
Viscount Haldane did in Snider? The use of historical material in such
circumstances would appear to justify its use anywhere. Why, for
example, should one be denied the right to an historical exposition of an
important item in the Canadian Criminal Code if it can be shown, as in
the Shortis case, that a typographical error had devastating consequences
for an accused? s Or, does the record show that we are operating under a
double standard: history may be used in constitutional cases but not in
criminal cases? Is there a case to be made for the proposition that
constitutional statutes are of a different kind and hence appropriately
amenable to historical support? Do constitutional cases force the courts
back to history in an effort to uncover the intention of Parliament? If so,
why is the intention of Parliament no less important in criminal matters? 6
Why must courts be strictly confined to the language of the enactment in
the interpretation of contracts and permitted to appeal to history in
constitutional cases? There are no easy answers to these general questions
but answers must, nevertheless, be found in particular instances.
The use of history is compounded further by the uncertainty of the
historical enterprise. The historical record is rarely so certain as to
provide a sure guide. Indeed, the historical record is frequently the
product of an historian who may have serious biases and prejudices. As
Clifford Ian Kyer has written citing the celebrated British historian, E.H.
3. See Gordon Bale, "Casting off the Mooring Ropes of Binding Precedent" (1980), 58
Canadian Bar Review 259.
4. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 183; see also
Frederick Vaughan, "Precedent and Nationalism in the Supreme Court of Canada", 6
American Review of Canadian Studies 2.
5. See Martin L. Friedland, The Case of Valentine Shortis (Toronto: The Osgoode Society,
1986), especially 38-41.
6. For a good account of what is taking place in the Supreme Court of Canada in the
construction of criminal cases, see Justice Lamer's judgment for a unanimous court in Paul v.
the Queen (1981). "... before applying mechanically and somewhat blindly any rule of
construction to the words of the section (of the Criminal Code) it is imperative that we closely
scrutinize the origin of the rule, its evolution over the years, the evolution of the context in
which it had been originally developed, and hopefully discover the reasons why it is today with
us in its present formulation". These comments precede a section of Lamer's judgment entitled
"The History of Section 645 (4)".
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Carr, "Before you study the history, study the historian".7 Kyer concludes
that "it is unrealistic to expect our judges to do good history". Indeed, if
Kyer is correct it would be unrealistic to expect professional historians to
do "good history". Not only do professional historians frequently
disagree over an interpretation of a given historic event - such as the
events surrounding Confederation - but the historical record itself is
often incomplete or unclear. We must realize, he counsels, "that the
materials available to ascertain the intentions of the Fathers of
Confederation are scanty and in many ways deficient for consitutional
purposes. What documents exist do not provide clear answers to the
questions asked of our courts. Rather they present problems of evaluation
and interpretation".8 Kyer's general conclusion is that due to the fact that
"historical truth is very elusive", "history does not hold the answers to the
constitutional questions we pose for our courts". Indeed, he asserts that
"the use of historical materials presents a threat, namely, that historical
arguments may well mask essentially political decision-making". 9
Unfortunately, Kyer does not explore further this intriguing issue. It
would be hard to imagine constitution-making that was not a form of
"political decision-making". We will return to this point later in a
discussion of the problem of intention of the framers.
It is important to understand that Kyer does not dismiss or discount all
forms of history. He approves of the use of statutory history by the
Supreme Court of Canada as in the Blaikie case where the Court referred
to the Quebec Resolutions. Kyer sees the "use of other statutes to
determine the meaning to be given a statute under consideration such as
was done by Chief Justice Laskin in Jones, 10 as a long-standing technique
of statutory interpretation... I see no reason why this sort of historical
inquiry ought not to be used in constitutional cases. It is another story, I
would suggest, with the use of the documents of Confederation". 11 He
explicitly excludes the documents of Confederation from use by judges in
determining the use of such central terms of the Constitution Ac4 1867,
as "trade and commerce', "property and civil rights in the province", and
"administration of justice in the province". Kyer claims that the available
documents do not assist the courts in understanding precisely what was
meant by these phrases. But could one not argue in reply that the
7. The most recent Canadian discussion of this issue is by Clifford Ian Kyer, "Has History a
Role to Play in Constitutional Adjudication: Some Preliminary Observations", The Law
Society Gazette 135.
8. Id, at 151.
9. Id, at 157.
10. A.G.for Quebec v. Blaikie (1978), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 42.
11. Kyer, supra, note 7 at 140.
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available documents provide a context within which to achieve, at a
minimum, an understanding of the general framework of these terms? the
available documents give Kyer sufficient clarity as to be able to say with
confidence that both John A. Macdonald and George Brown "wished to
have a strong central government and to reduce the provincial
governments to essentially municipal institutions." 12 If the documents
provide certainty on this important matter, might they not provide
equally enlightening guidance on the scope of the "peace, order and good
government" clause, especially since the documents show that the phrase
was "peace, welfare and good government" until the fourth draft of the
Confederation bill?13 Indeed, would not this form of historical evidence
become statutory history and hence admissible?
A close examination of the long and often acrimonious debate over the
meaning of the major terms of the Constitution Act, 1867, reveals that
those who advocate strong provinces are most insistent on excluding the
historical record surrounding Confederation. That record as WP.M.
Kennedy and others have demonstrated does little to support the rise of
autonomous provinces. These same defenders of strong provinces who
eschew the use of Confederation history are quick to justify the
decentralizing work of Judicial Committee by the use of contemporary
history or as Alan Cairns prefers "the sociological realities" of the times.
G.P. Brown, on the other hand, commends the law lords for avoiding this
historical pitfall. 14
HI History and Judicial Discretion
W.H. Charles writing in the Dalhousie Law Journal recently addressed
the use of extrinsic evidence in the context of judicial discretion.15 It is a
valuable contribution to the debate. Charles' article does not deal
formally with the use of history as an extrinsic aid to judicial
interpretation. He does, however, invite consideration of the problem of
history as an element of judicial discretion. This leads directly to the
problem of the judicial function. Charles asks: "How far beyond the
12. Kyer, supra, note 7 at 156.
13. The draft copies are preserved in the Macdonald Papers, M.G. 26AI(a), Vol. XLIX, Part
2, P.A.C.
14. Browne, Documents on the Confederation of British North America, (Toronto, 1969) at
XXVI. For an interesting discussion of the use of English law in pre-Confederation British
North America, see G. Blaine Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought
in the Late-Victorian Empire" (1985), 3 Law and History Review 219, especially 249-251. See
also Elizabeth Gasper Brown, "British Statutes in the Emergent Nations of North America:
1606-1949" (1963), 7 American Journal of Legal History 95.
15. W.H. Charles, "Extrinsic Evidence and Statutory Interpretation: Judicial Discretion in
Context" (1983), 7 Dalhousie L.J. 7.
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actual words of the statute itself is it permissible for courts to roam in
their efforts to interpret legislation?"'16 He claims that this question leads
directly to further "questions about the proper constitutional function of
a court and the exercise of judicial discretion". In general, Charles
observes, the common law tradition permits the use of statutes in pari
materia and previous versions but excludes legislative history of debates
in Hansard and related material. In this he is in agreement with Kyer. But
Charles explores the actual practice of Canadian courts and finds a
growing departure in more recent decades from the general common law
rule. A major reason for the departure, he claims, is the emergence of
Law Reform Commissions. "Courts have found it increasingly difficult to
ignore the guidance and assistance provided by Law Reform
Commission studies and reports when called upon to interpret the
provisions of a statute enacted pursuant to such a report".17 The result in
Canada has been that the courts have used Law Commission and even
Royal Commission reports. It is reasonable that the courts should make
use of such studies and reports because they represent the products of
very talented and highly qualified legal experts. In a certain sense they
can be perceived as research assistants for the courts as well as for
legislatures. Their work is highly legal as well as political so that it fits
easily into the work of judging, especially in constitutional cases. 18
The use of this kind of extrinsic evidence has tended now to be
acceptable; the debate appears to be over what constitutes "proper use"
and away from "absolute exclusion". It is an old debate in the United
States going back many decades to the use of the Brandeis brief. The
Brandeis brief, however, tends to be more sociological than legal, unlike
the Law Reform Commission reports. This difference has led the
Supreme Court of the United States, some would argue, to reach
jurisprudentially shaky results, as in Brown v. The Board of Education'9
under Chief Justice Earl Warren. On the other hand, others would argue
that the Brandeis brief used in Muller v. Oregon (1908)20, in which more
than a hundred pages of statistics and other documentary evidence were
presented to the court, was responsible for the Court's departure from the
narrow ruling in Lochnerjust three years earlier. In that case the Supreme
Court ruled that the New York law limiting the working hours of bakers
involved "neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public". 21
16. Id
17. Id, at 8.
18. For a discussion of constitutional interpretation in Canada, see Peter W. Hogg, supra, note
4, at 340-341.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 208 U.S. 412.
21. Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 at 57 (1905).
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In Muller the Supreme Court agreed that the sociological evidence
presented was persuasive in determing "the extent to which a special
constitutional limitation" would go, even though "technically speaking"
the evidence was not constitutionally authoritative. The use in Canada of
such extrinsic aids has not yet reached the level of the Brandeis brief with
the possible exception of the Anti-Inflation case. The debate in Canada
tended, until very recently, to revolve around the problem of proper use
and judicial discretion. Indeed, one senses from recent extra-legal
comments from members of the bench in Canada that the courts are
looking for guidance in this matter; they give the impression that they
would welcome a thorough airing of the issues and the implications
involved. Professor Charles has played a central role in this matter. He
warns that unless the legislature takes a stand on the issue and gives
guidance to the courts, the courts could begin to resolve the matter
themselves within the context of judicial discretion. But Charles is not
overly optimistic. If the recent attempt of Lord Scarman in the
Parliament of the United Kingdom is an example of what might happen
in Canada, there is little grounds for optimism. Lord Scarman, acting on
the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of the United
Kingdom and Scotland and the Renton Committee on the Preparation of
Legislation introduced an Interpretation Bill into the House of Lords in
1980 and 1981.2 That bill failed after members of the British bar
objected on the grounds that the admission of extrinsic evidence would
increase the cost of litigation by lengthening trials through the
introduction of marginally relevant material. In short, the British bar
preferred to function under the present divergent practice.
IV History and the Intention of Parliament
Charles makes it clear that a central, if not the central, question revolves
around the widely held belief that it is the function of the judge to seek
out, in the language of the act, the intention of the legislator. We must
now turn to this important question and explore the extent to which
Canadian courts (including the Judicial Committee) have set about to
determine the intention of the legislature.
As with many contentious legal issues the problem of intention of the
legislature has been more fully and vigorously debated in the United
States than in Canada. Indeed the problem of intention of the framers in
the United States seems to be a ghost that refuses to be exorcized. The
recent flurry of writings and comments on the question of intention of the
22. House of Lords Debates on Interpretation of Legislation Bill, 13 February, 1980, at 275-
306, and 9 March 1981, at 63-84.
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framers was prompted by Edwin Meese, Attorney General of the United
States. Speaking to British lawyers in London, Meese opened the
proverbial can of worms with his musings on how the court, especially
the Supreme Court of the United States, should not supplant the intention
of the framers by its collective and subjective views of the constitution.3
This prompted a reply from Justice William Brennan who vigorously
championed an alternative position.
Much abuse has been heaped upon the heads of those who would
direct judicial attention to the intention of the framers. Myres McDougal
and Asher Lans scornfully rejected such an approach with the charge that
it constituted "filio-pietism" or "verbal archeology".2 4 Others, agreeing
with McDougal and Lans, claim that the framers themselves intended to
leave it "to succeeding generations (of judges, presumably)... to rewrite
the 'living' constitution anew".25 To seek the original intention is in the
minds of some authorities to freeze its original meaning. No less a
distinguished American constitutional authority than Edwin Corwin
dismissed in 1925 the "speculative ideas about what the framers of the
constitution... intended" it should mean "because the main business of
constitutional interpretation... is to keep the constitution adjusted to the
advancing needs of time".26
Other authorities insist that the intention of the legislators or framers
is the principal means of ensuring that the judiciary does not usurp the
function of the legislative body. James Madison wrote that if "the sense
in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation... be
not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent
and stable government, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers". 27
The intention of the framers is to be consulted and respected not because
it is old or antiquated, but because it is the expression of a very thoughtful
process by very thoughtful men. It is not to say that no constitutional
23. "Address, The Honorable Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States",
Wednesday, July 17, 1985, Grosvenor House, London, England (Washington: Department of
Justice). See also Edwin Meese III, "The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution" (1986), 27 South Texas Law Review 455; Edwin Meese III,
"Construing the Constitution" (1985), 19 University of California Davis Law Review 22. For
Justice Brennan's response to Meese, see "The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification" (1985), 19 University of California Davis Law Review 2. See
Meese's response to Brennan: "The Battle for the Constitution: The Attorney General Replies
to His Critics", Policy Review, Winter 1986, at 32-35.
24. Edward Corwin, American ConstitutionalHistory (Mason and Gamey, eds., 1964).
25. James Madison, The Writings of James Madison, Vol. 9 (G. Hunt, ed. 1900-1910), 191.
26. H. Jefferson Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent" (1985), 982
Harvard Law Review 885 at 887.
27. Id at 888.
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amendments are proper or desirable. The legislative process must always
be available to effect such changes.
The alternative to judicial respect for the intention of the framers is to
substitute the whim of judges caught up in the give and take of the
emotions of the moment. One shudders at what might have happened in
the United States during the McCarthy era if judges had not calmed the
emotional storms by appealing to the intention of the framers in questions
of free speech and association.
What is ironic in this struggle for the intention of the framers is that the
denigration of the framers' intentions is of relatively recent origin. As H.
Jefferson Powell notes: "Contemporary intentionists are correct ... in
claiming that resort to 'original intent' is an interpretive strategy of great
antiquity in American constitutional discourse". 28 But as Powell points
out, "To the extent that constitutional interpreters considered historical
evidence to have any interpretive value, what they deemed relevant was
evidence of the proceedings of the state ratifying conventions, not of the
Intent of the framers".2 9 In other words, it was not the alleged, real or
apparent wisdom of individual framers that was sought but the collective
wisdom of the framers as a whole. This distinction is very important
when applied to Canada. John A. Macdonald was not by any stretch of
the imagination a profound constitutional thinker. But when he is
considered in the context of the entire constitutional debate - in which
he vied with brighter men such as Christopher Dunkin - his views
became important. The individual participants in the give and take of
debate are not as important as the general perspective and conclusions
reached as a result of the debate. And those perspectives and conclusions
are available in the various legislative debates. In sum, the quest for the
intention of the framers is a form of deference to the legislature.
Furthermore, we must not dismiss too quickly the possibility that the
framers saw the broader, more permanent issues more clearly than we do
today. To say that they did not see (could not have seen) the modem
developments in science and technology is beside the point. The
constitutional arrangement can accommodate these kinds of changes.
What is important are the values of the community ensconced in the
original document. Those intangible values go into making a community
distinct and worth preserving. The quest for the intention of the framers
is, hence, a quest for and a reaffirmation of those fundamental values.
In Canada the issue of intention of the Fathers of Confederation has
almost been permanently put to rest. The question as to whether the
28. d at 885.
29. Id
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Judicial Committee did or did not seek and follow the intention of the
Fathers of Confederation is an antiquarian issue. It has never been
formally resolved, but it is rarely ever discussed. The leading authorities
in recent years - Alan Cairns and G.P. Browne30 - are on the opposite
sides of the issue. They agree only on the fact that what the Judicial
Committee did was good for Canada. They, of course, stand in marked
contrast to an earlier generation of constitutional scholars such as
Kennedy and Forsey who claim that the Judicial Committee consciously
distorted the terms of the Constitution Act 186Z
The considerable literature on the subject is instructively confusing. Sir
Ivor Jennings, writing in the Harvard Law Review claimed a half century
ago that the Judicial Commitee "has never seriously wavered from the
principle that it was their function to interpret the 'intention of
Parliament' as laid down in the Act and not to fit the Constitution to the
changing conditions of social life".31 This stands in contrast to Alan
Cairns' claim that the law lords took into account in their judgment the
sociological conditions, that they did not restrict themselves to the
language of the Constitution Ac1 32 Both sets of comments tend to be
contradicted by the explicit comments of the law lords. Viscount
Haldane, speaking of Lord Watson, wrote, for example, that "He was an
Imperial judge of the very first order. The function of such a judge, sitting
in the supreme tribunal of the Empire, is to do more than decide what
abstract and familiar legal conceptions should be applied to particular
cases. His function is to be a statesman as well as ajurist, to fill in the gaps
which Parliament has deliberately left in the skeleton constitution and
laws that it had provided for the British colonies". 33 The question for our
purposes here is: to what extent does this perception of the judicial
function permit judges to use historical material? Or, on what grounds
may the court (the Judicial Committee) set aside the language of the act
in the process of "filling in the gaps" of the "skeleton constitution"? The
Judgments of the Judicial Committee show that it did not adopt a single
course of action. At times it displayed concern about the intention of
Parliament as in Parsons (1881).34 Usually in such circumstances the
30. See Alan Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971), 4 Canadian Journal of
Political Science 301-45; G.P. Browne, The Judicial Committee and the British North America
Act (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). For a reply to both Cairns and Browne see
Frederick Vaughan: "Critics of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: The New
Orthodoxy and an Alternative Explantion" (1986), 19 Canadian Journal of Political Science
495.
31. HarvardLR. (1937), at 35.
32. Cairns, supra, note 30.
33. Viscount Haldane, "Lord Watson" (1899), Judicial Review 278.
34. See Montague Smith in Parsons, 7 A.C. 96 at 108.
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board was concerned to understand what Parliament could not have
intended. The overwhelming preoccupation of the law lords was with
articulating a conception of federalism that gave fundamental legislative
powers to the provinces in virtual defiance of the logic of the Constitution
Act, 1967. As late as 1937 the Judicial Committee drew back from
according paramount power to the Parliament of Canada. Lord Atkin,
for example, feared that "to hold otherwise (than in favor of the
provinces) would afford the Dominion an easy passage into the
provincial domain".3 5 No matter that the Fathers of Confederation may
have intended Parliament to have an "easy access". There was a clear
disposition, especially throughout the early years, among members of the
Judicial Committee to resolve in their own minds a conception of
federalism rather than to uncover the intention of Parliament, or better,
of Parliament's conception of federalism. 6
Nevertheless, the Judicial Committee did address the issue of the role
of history. In the Tiny Township case, for example, Viscount Haldane
began by asserting that their lordships would resolve the issue "as one of
pure legal interpretation" 7 Haldane then made it clear that it was
necessary for the Board to take into account "the history of education of
Canada" as an aid in resolving the dispute. Indeed, as to the central
question of the rights of separate school supporters, Haldane repeated
that "it is necessary to look at the history of the development of education
in Canada".38 Having been persuaded by the weight of historical evidence
that "a settlement which in so far as it remained unaltered at
Confederation, must be strictly maintained", 39 Haldane then retreated
from the force of the historical evidence to the traditional interpretation
of the language of the 1867 Act. The historical considerations, which
took up so much of his lordship's time in his judgment, did "not relieve
a Court of law from the obligation to confine itself strictly to the meaning
of the words which define the legal rights".40 The inherent unsatisfactory
nature of this judgment left it as a legal problem to the present day.
Canadian courts have given every indication that they will take
Confederation history into account. As recently as 1983 in The Attorney-
General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation Ltd., the late
Chief Justice Laskin, writing for himself and six of his colleagues, openly
acknowledged that he "examined the pre-Confederation debates in the
35. Browne, supra, note 30 at 31.
36. See note 30 supra.
3Z Roman Catholic School Trustees v. the King (1928), J.C. 363 at 367.
38. Id, at 376.
39. Id, at 385-386.
40. Id, at 386.
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then provincial Parliament of Canada". 41 Laskin roamed throughout the
1865 Legislative debates and cited John A. Macdonald, Hector Langevin
and Christopher Dunkin in an effort to understand the scope of the
federal authority over criminal law.
In the more recent Ontario Court of Appeal reference respecting the
extention of full funding to separate schools, both the court minority and
court majority relied extensively on the history of education in pre-
Confederation Canada. In effect, the reference re-opened the Tiny
Township case. Indeed, at times one gets the impression that the courts
are being asked to settle not a legal but an historical problem. At the
outset of his minority judgment, Chief Justice Howland claimed that it
was necessary "to trace the history of the separate school system in
Ontario in order to determine what rights or privileges Roman Catholics
had by law at the time of Confederation under s.93(1), and the effect of
legislation subsequently enacted". 42 It is important to understand that the
historical record contained, in Howland's view, evidence as to "rights"
and "effect" of subsequent legislation. Small wonder he proceeded
systematically throughout the pre-Confederation, Confederation and
post-Confederation historical records in an attempt to resolve the issue of
separate school rights to full financial support. But the Ontario Chief
Justice even went into the history of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in an effort to find the intention of Parliament with respect to
s.29.43 This included judicial scrutiny of earlier drafts" of the Charter as
well as the Judicial Committee judgment in the Tiny Township case.
Unfortunately, the court majority also appealed to the same historical
record. Justice Walter Tarnopolsky writing for the majority not only
researched extensively the legislative debates of 1865, he also referred to
Parliamentary debates on remedial legislation 30 years later. On section
29 of the Charter, Tarnoposky observed that it "is interesting to note that
s.29 did not appear in the initial proposal for the Charter, in October,
1980. In fact, it was not added even after the representations made to the
Special Joint Committee during late 1980, pursuant to which the
Minister of Justice proposed a number of amendments on 14 January,
1981".45 Tarnopolsky dwelt at length on the Joint Committee
41. (1983), 2 S.C.R. 206 at 225.
42. In the Matter of a Reference to the Court of Appeal (Ontario) ... respecting Bill 30, An
Act to Amend the Education Act to provide full funding for Roman Catholic Separate
Schools, February 18, 1986. Mimeo, p. 8, 9 (Hereinafter referred to as Ontario Separate
School Funding Case).
43. Id, at 65.
44. See Robin Elliot, "Interpreting the Charter - Use of Earlier Versions as an Aid" (1982),
University of British Columbia Law Journal, Charter Edition 11.
45. Ontario Separate School Funding Case, 1986, at 19.
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proceedings in an effort to determine the importance to be accorded to
s.29 of the Charter. In short, the same historical record led the court
majority to reach conclusions opposite to those reached by the Chief
Justice.
In another Ontario Court of Appeal reference involving minority
language educational rights, the Court noted, before embarking upon a
long historical foray into the records surrounding minority language
rights, that history "while not determinative in the construction of
statutes, provides insight into the background of a statute".46 It is difficult
not to conclude that the Ontario Court of Appeal majority and minority
in the Bill 30 reference did not use history as a determinative manner.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in the minority language education
reference claimed that the Charter has changed significantly the nature of
constitutional review. The Court said:
With the enactment of the Constitution Ac4 1982,the dominant principle
of constitutional law is no longer centered exclusively on the division of
legislative authority between the federal and provincial levels of
government. The preservation and enforcement of the guaranteed rights,
including minority language educational rights, and of fundamental
freedoms have changed the focus of constitutional law and the role of the
courts. We believe that the court's concern for these rights requires a move
away from narrow and strict constructionalism towards a broader
approach, which would include a consideration of the historical
developments, particularly in the field of education.47
The Court went on to say that it saw no difficulty considering "relevant
political, economic, social and cultural developments". 48 As to what the
courts would do with such material, a unanimous five-man Ontario
Court of Appeal left no doubt: "Such considerations may serve to
broaden our approach to the issue at hand, and it avoids resort to strict
legal principles of interpretation. We would include in our considerations
the conditions and contemporary facts which existed before and at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution Ac4 1982, in order to be able to
ascertain the interest of the constitutional amendments providing for the
protection of minority language education" 49 In light of these comments
it is not surprising to find the Court citing the writings of historians such
as Mason Wade and a full range of Parliamentary reports as well as a
number of law review articles, some of which were written by Justice
46. Reference to the Court of Appeal (Ontario) re The Education Ac4 R.S.O. 1980, Chapter
129 and Minority Language Educational Rights (1984), mimeo.
47. Id, at 19.
48. Id, at20
49. Id
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Tarnopolsky before joining the Ontario Court of Appeal. Indeed, the
judgment reads more like a law review article than a court judgment.
V History and the Capacity of the Fathers of Confederation
If there is one characteristic of Canadian constitutional history that
distinguishes it from its American counterpart it is the anti-intellectual
attitude of the former.50 The great Canadian historian Donald C.
Creighton enunciated that attitude most precisely when he wrote that our
Fathers of Confederation were hard-headed practical politicians
unconcerned with principles. This view was shared by Creighton's
archrival historian, A.R.M. Lower, who wrote that: "So far did the
practical legal spirit go that the proposed (Confederation) got little debate
from the point of view of underlying theory".51 And this was a good
thing, added WM.P. Kennedy, a leading constitutional authority. The
absence of a philosophic or theoretical spirit saved Canada, Kennedy
insisted, "from much emotional challenge, from the so-called invasion of
sacrosanct instruments, and from any attempt to confine (constitutional)
interpretation within a preconceived Canadian notion of the essence of
the Canadian system".52 Many Canadian historians and constitutional
law professors dismissed the introduction of the American preoccupation
with the founding with the charge that it was un-Canadian. They pointed
proudly at Burke who suggested that a "sacred veil" be thrown over the
origin of nations. Indeed, he claimed that it "is always to be lamented,
when men are driven to search into the foundations of the common-
wealth".5 3 No one expressed the anti-founding view more precisely than
the Austrian-born British philosopher Karl Popper when he wrote that
The social engineer and technologist,... will hardly take much interest in
the origin of institutions, or in the original intentions of their founders...
Rather, he will put his problem like this: If such and such are our aims, is
this institution well designed and organized to serve them? 4
Clearly this spirit, whatever its source, has dominated the practical legal
advice over the past several decades of constitutional reform in Canada.
The original principles prompting our framers to adopt a constitutional
system very different from the American founders is buried in the past
not to be sought out and pondered as aids for our times. They were
50. For a refreshing departure from this trend see, Philip Resnick, "Montesquieu Revisited, or
the Mixed Constitution and the Separation of Powers in Canada" (1987), 20 Canadian
Journal of Political Science 97.
51. Lower, Evolving Canadian Federalism (Duke, 1958), at 86.
52. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada (Oxford, 1922), at 405.
53. Speech on a Bill for "Shortening the Duration of Parliaments" (1780), Works V. 71.
54. Karl Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, at 23 (Princeton, Fifth Edition, 1966).
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simply practical principles designed to meet the exigencies of a specific
period of Canadian history, no longer useful to our present needs or
purposes. (So the historians would have us believe.)
This was the orthodox view until very recently. Peter J. Smith has
boldly suggested that Canadian political scientists and historians begin to
understand the Confederation settlement in the light of the ideological
influences of pre-Confederation sources stemming from Britain, the
United States and France. He suggests that the Canadian founding in
1867 can be understood more clearly in terms of the "debate between the
defenders of classical republican values and the proponents of a rising
commercial ideology formulated during the Enlightenment". 55 One does
not have to agree with Smith's Pocockian premises to be encouraged by
his suggestions, for unless Canada was founded in a legal and
constitutional vacuum, it was in important respects a product of certain
identifiable theoretical influences. Smith is clearly correct to suggest that
the entire period be reopened and looked at afresh, not for antiquarian
reasons but for practical reasons. The reopening should assist us to
understand more clearly the vision of our Fathers of Confederation; or,
to put it in more acceptable modern jargon, to assist us to understand and
appreciate more clearly our founding values. The quest, therefore, should
be towards uncovering those practical principles of the framers with a
view to ascertaining what the regime as a whole was designed to embody
and preserve. This clearly stands as a defiant alternative to Popper and his
disciples. It also stands as an invitation to reject the anti-intellectual
myopia of recent writers such as Black, Smiley and Cairns whose
pragmatism is based on an implicit rejection of the wisdom of our Fathers
of Confederation.
This "new" history will certainly have an impact on constitutional
adjudication to the extent that there is no alternative to the "intention of
the framers". The Charter of Rights and Freedoms clearly forces our
courts into the debate over intention but since the Charter is meant to
apply to all aspects or facets of the Constitution Ac4 1867, the original
arrangement must be re-understood in terms of the intentions of the
framers. The Charter has opened up problems not only for the future but
also for the past. In the light of this development, it is incumbant upon
academic historians, political scientists and law professors to return to the
cellar of our nation's history for a more thoughtful reassessment of our
foundations, for history is indispensable to constitutional adjudication.
There is no longer any question as to whether our courts may or may not
55. See Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation" (1987), XX:I
Canadian Journal of Political Science 3 for a lengthy footnote in which he cites the orthodox
view from the writings of a list of contemporary writers such as Smiley.
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resort to the extrinsic aid of constitutional history. There can be no
constitutional adjudication worthy of the name without it.
Finally, the retreat from constitutional history can be traced to a
specific period in the 19th century. Ironic as it may sound, the anti-
historical judicial view emerged out of the 19th century legal positivism
which was the stepchild of 19th century German historicism. The
confusion in this matter can be seen in all its clarity (oxymoron intended)
by a perusal of Robert W. Gordon's recent Yale Law Journal article on
"-istoricism in Legal Scholarship".56 By "historicism", Gordon means
"the recognition of the historical and cultural contingency of law". What
exactly Gordon is proposing is not clear; an iconoclastic attitude towards
traditional legal research is about all one gets from his musings. Certainly
there are no solutions to real problems to be found in his approach:
In this delightfully heterodox climate there is reason to hope that our
mainstream legal scholarship will at last move beyond its standard modes
of responding to historicist assertions of the social contingency of law and
legal nationalizations. Doubtless, there are solutions to the problems, but
the modes as they have been practiced have inhibited the development of
more interesting responses, calling forth in their turn new criticism, and so
onward in a dialogue lifted clear of the old gravitational field. 57
It is difficult to see how helpful this approach to legal scholarship could
possibly be. It certainly is not designed to lead scholars back to the
constitutional text. As Gordon says:
The old text will be rendered almost wholly archaic if it can be shown to
embody a set of conceptions - about human nature, property, virtue,
freedom, representation, necessity, causation, and so forth - that was a
unique configuration for its time and in some ways strikingly unlike what
we believe to be our own.ss
Michael Oakeshott believes that the historian must "understand past
conduct and happenings in a manner in which they were never
understood at the time".59 This would seem to ask the historian to do the
impossible. At best we should expect that the historian understand the
framers of our constitution as they understood themselves. To impose an
alien (modern) paradigm on the past is to sin twice: it is both distortion
and arrogance, the product of modem hubris,
V1 History and the Charter
One thing appears certain from the recent cases arising under the Charter:
history has a central role to play. But why should the adoption of the
56. Robert W. Gordon, "Historicism in Legal Scholarship" (1980-81) 90 Yale Law Journal.
57. Id, at
58. Id, at 1021
59. Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1967), at 164.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms alter so profoundly the rules of
constitutional construction? What is it about the Charter that makes
history so important
There can be no question that the Charter has provoked several
members of the Supreme Court of Canada to ponder aloud the nature of
the judicial function and the use of extrinsic aids, such as history.
Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, for example, in her Goodman lectures
claims that "the scope of judicial review of legislative and executive acts
has been vastly expanded under the Charter" 60 This expansion, she
reasoned "calls for a more sophisticated appreciation by the judges
themselves of the process in which they are engaged". 60 She spoke at
length about the two general categories of judges, those "judges
committed to principled decision-making for whom the rationality of the
law is paramount. They want to make law only imperceptibly and
incrementally by applying existing principles to fresh facts".62 The other
category of judges "chafe at embalmed legal tradition and see stare
decisis as a form of ancestor worship. They want to update the law and
make it relevant to their times". The tension between these two schools
of judging has become exacerbated by the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Charter virtually mandates the institutionalization of the
second group mentioned by Justice Wilson. She believes that sections 1,
24 and 52 of the Charter effectively remove the grounds for judicial self-
restraint as exhibited by the Supreme Court in Harrison v. CarsweIL63
Those sections, she claims, "effectively remove this rationale from
judicial restraint by casting the judiciary in a clearly interventionist role.
We can no longer rely on the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament as
a reason for staying our hand".64 The new role for the courts forces judges
out of the easy comfort of 19th century legal positivism into the realm of
norms. "The challenge for the courts is to develop norms against which
the reasonableness of the impairment of a person's rights can be measured
in a vast variety of different contexts... These norms must reflect to the
maximum extent possible the political ideal of a free and democratic
society". 65 But how will judges arrive at these norms without the use of
extrinsic aids?
Are the courts advised to consult the historical record surrounding the
adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Robin Elliot
believes that the courts would be well advised to study the seven distinct
steps through which the Charter progressed before it reached its final
60. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, The David B. Goodman Memorial Lectures, University
of Toronto, November 26-27, 1985. Lecture #2, at 3, mimeo.
61. Id,
62. Id, at 1.
63. (1976), 2 S.C.R. 200.
64. Justice Bertha Wilson, supra, note 60 at 2.
65. Id, at 9.
The Use of History in Canadian Constitutional Adjudication
form in 1982.6 Elliot claims that the various drafts reveal the extent to
which such crucial Charter provisions as the legislative override clause
(added in the sixth version) and the equality of rights provision (s. 15(1))
underwent intense scrutiny. By far and away the most important lesson
for the courts from such a perusal is how the general or overall intention
of the framers of the act worked its way into the final language adopted.
The general drift of that development reveals the struggle for an
articulation of the norms Justice Wilson was referring to in her Goodman
lectures. If, as Peter Russell contends, the Charter mandates the judicial
impositions of national standards then the courts would be more than
advised to seek assistance in understanding what those standards are.67
Elliot correctly observes that there has long been an uneasy flirtation
with history in both the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the
Supreme Court of Canada. And the late Bora Laskin concluded after a
review of the issue of the use of extrinsic aids generally that "there has
been no consistency in this matter by the Courts". 68 The reason why there
remains so much uncertainty would appear to arise out of the failure to
distinguish clearly between statutory and constitutional construction. As
Jacobus ten Broek observed many years ago:
More serious in its consequences has been the almost universal failure to
distinguish between the problem involved in statutory construction and
that involved in constitutional construction. Statutes are usually efforts to
accomplish individual or highly related ends. As such the conditions
surrounding their origin and the intent of the legislature in passing them
are matters possessing an informative value. They are the instruments of
relatively small bodies composed of members presumably capable of
understanding and using comparatively exact and technical language.
Secondly, aside from the fact that statutes aim to meet temporary and
changing conditions and the fact that they are generally judicially
construed before these conditions have passed away, there is the extremely
important circumstance that legislative bodies meet in frequent session and
hence may change the words used if their actual intention is not
effectuated. But not so constitutions! They are vastly more general and are
intended to be relatively permanent. As a result of these two factors, the
judicial function of moulding constitutions by construction is proportion-
ately greater than in the case of statutes, and the court's freedom of
decision is less restricted. Moreover, constitutions are framed and adopted
by different bodies, and if the intent of those who gave the instrument
force is to be sought, the matter of numbers alone seems preclusive, and
the meaning of language must be taken from its most common,
untechnical, and uniform use. Finally, if the original intent is not carried
66. Robin Elliot, supra, note 44 at 11.
67. Peter H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms"(1981), 61 C.B.R. 30.
68. Bora Laskin, Canadian ConstitutionalLaw (Carswell, 3rd ed.) at 156.
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out by the courts, there is not the ready opportunity to revise and restate
which exists in the case of statutes.69
The use of the extrinsic aid of history in constitutional construction is
especially important where the intention of the framers is the duty of the
court. The Supreme Court of Canada attempted to establish this point
early in its history. Justice Sedgewick in In re Prohibitory Liquor Laws
(1894)70 wrote that:
The British North American Act 1867, must be reviewed from a
Canadian standpoint. Although an Imperial Act, to interpret correctly
reference may be had to the phraseology and nomenclature of pre-
confederation Canadian legislation and jurisprudence, as well as to the
history of the union movement and to the condition, sentiment and
surroundings of the Canadian people at the time. In the British North
America Act it was in a technical sense only that the Imperial Parliament
spoke; it was there that in a real and substantial sense the Canadian people
spoke, and it is to their language, as they understood it, that effect must be
given.71
But the early Supreme Court was clearly not unanimous in this matter.
In Severn v. The Queen (1877) 72 a clear difference of view emerged in
the judgements of Justice Ritchie and Chief Justice Sir William Buell
Richards. In a case involving the interpretation of the federal authority
over trade and commerce as well as the provincial right to require
licenses for the purpose of raising a revenue for local purposes, Justice
Ritchie argued that the duty of the court was to apply "the golden rule"
of statutory construction. The duty of the court was "to read the words
of an Act of Parliament in their natural, ordinary and grammatical sense,
giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity". 73 The Chief
Justice argued in opposition to Ritchie that the court was obliged to look
at the intention of the framers and not merely at the language of the Act.
Above all, the Chief Justice contended, the court must bear in mind the
overall intention of the Canadian framers to avoid "the difficulties which
have arisen in the great Federal Republic".74 Chief Justice Richards
viewed the efforts of the provinces to invade the federal authority over
trade and commerce "pregnant with evil" and clearly "contrary to what
was intended by the framers of the British North America Act " 75 Mr.
69. Jacobus ten Broek, "Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction" (1983), 26 Calif. Law Rev. 287 at 289.
70. 245 C.R. 170.
71. (1894), S.C.R. 231.
72. (1877), 2 SCR 70.
73. Id, at 99.
74. Id, at 87.
75. Id, at 95.
The Use of History in Canadian Constitutional Adjudication
Justice Henry had been a delegate to both the Quebec and London
conferences and sided with the Chief Justice. Henry accordingly urged
his colleagues to take their bearing from "the tenor and bearing of the
whole Act, the state of the law at the time, the peculiar position of the
United Provinces and the object of their union".76 The tension on the
Court was clearly between those who viewed the British North American
Ac4 1867, as an ordinary statute and those who viewed it as a
constitutional document.
The same tension pervaded the judgments of the Judicial Committee.
Lord Sankey in Edwards v. The Attorney-General of Canada77 (1930)
gave the most widely cited view of the Judicial Committee. Sankey
wrote:
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the Act was
to grant a constitution to Canada... their Lordships do not conceive it to
be the duty of this Board... to cut down the provisions of the Act by a
narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal
interpretation.
The more generous view followed more than 50 years after the Judicial
Committee had done its work by a narrow statutory construction of the
terms of the British North America Act The principal villains were Lord
Watson and Viscount Haldane.78 The latter could make use of history
and other extrinsic aids whenever it suited his purposes. In Snider79, for
example, he justified the Judicial Committee's reasoning in Russell v.
The Queen (1882) on the grounds "at the time of deciding the case of
Russell v. The Queen, ... the evils of intemperance at that time
amounted in Canada to one so great and so general that at least for a
period it was a menace to the national life of Canada so serious and so
pressing that the National Parliament was called on to intervene to
protect the nation from disaster."
Haldane and Watson both believed that their function as members of
the Judicial Committee was to act as "statesmen". For them the art of
judicial statesmanship was clearly to participate in a forward-looking
process. "The state is made", Haldane wrote on one occasion, "not by
external acts, but by the continuous thought and action of the people who
76. Id, at 140.
77. (1930), A.C. 124.
78. In addition to articles by Cairns and Browne, cited earlier, see Stephen Wexler, "The Urge
to Idealize: Viscount Haldane and the Constitution of Canada" (1984), 29 McGill Law Journal
609-50; See also Murray Greenwood, "Lord Watson, Institutional Self-interest, and the
Decentralization of Canadian Federalism in the 1890's" (1974), 9 University of British
Columbia Law Review. 244-279.
79. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider (1925), A.C. 396.
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live its life. In this sense it is never perfect for it is a process that remains
always unbroken in creative activity". 80 The commitment to this
"creative activity" left no room for a "submissive allegiance" to a
founding vision.
Haldane praised Watson for rendering
... an enormous service to the Empire and to the Dominion of Canada
by developing the Dominion constitution. At one time, after the BNA Act
of 1867 was passed, the conception took hold of the Canadian Courts and
what was intended to make the Dominion the centre of government in
Canada, so that its statutes and its position should be superior to the
statutes and position of the provincial legislatures. That went so far that
there arose a great fight, and as the result of a long series of decisions Lord
Watson put clothing upon the bones of the Constitution, and so covered
them over with living flesh that the constitution of Canada took a new
form. The provinces were recognized as of equal authority coordinate with
the Dominion, and a long series of decisions were given by him which
solved many problems and produced a new contentment in Canada with
the constitution they had got in 1867.81
The prior commitment of the Judicial Committee to judicial
statesmanship resulted in a political jurisprudence. The Judicial
Committee was prepared to take into account the "sociological realities"
of the post-Confederation period - Le. contemporary history - but was
not disposed to consider the historic evidence surrounding the
Confederation agreement.82
I. History and Native Claims
The one area of law in Canada where history is unavoidable shows how
difficult the matter really is. In native claims cases the courts are required
to confront the use of history directly. A review of a few of the leading
cases shows that there is considerable confusion due to the convergence
of a number of problems. First, not only is the court confronted with
historical documents, it is also confronted with the use of oral history.
Second, the court is forced to make a decision between taking judicial
notice of historical material and admitting such material in evidence.
Finally, the court is caught in the common law rules governing use and
ownership which might be inappropriate to claims that are rooted in an
80. M.P. Follett, The New State, "Introduction by Viscount Haldane", at viii (London:
Longmans, Green 1926).
81. Viscount Haldane, "The Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council" (1923), 1 Cambridge Law Review 148.
82. See" Maherv. Town of Portland(1974), A.C. 362.
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ancestral tradition essentially incompatible with the common law
tradition.
Beginning with Regina v. St Catharine's Milling and Lumber Co.,83 in
1886, the courts of Canada have wrestled with the legal propriety of
using historical documents. In this case as well as in Re Eskimaux
(1939)84 the courts used historical documents and records in arriving at
their conclusions. In the first case, the Privy Council ruled that the lands
reserved for the Indians were not among the properties transferred to the
Dominion by the property provisions of the British North America Act,
1867. In the second case, historical evidence was relied upon to
determine who is properly classified as an Indian. The Supreme Court of
Canada ruled that the Eskimo inhabitants of Quebec are included in the
aboriginal groups covered by Section 91(24) of the British North
America Act, 1867
The issue of native claims remained fairly quiescent until more recent
years. In the leading case, Calder v. the Attorney General of British
Columbia (1973),85 the Supreme Court split on the essential issue of
whether the Nishga Indians' oboriginal title to their ancient tribal
territory had been extinguished. The Indians claimed that their aboriginal
title to 1,000 square miles in and around the Nass River Valley,
Observatory Inlet, Portland Inlet and the Portland Canal had not been
extinguished. What is important for our purposes there is that both
factions on the Court (one led by Justice Judson and the other led by
Justice Hall) relied heavily on history, at times the same historical
material. Judson cited a history of Indians in British Columbia by Wilson
Duff, an anthropologist. Relying in part on the St Catharines case,
Judson asserted: "I base my opinion upon the very terms of the
Proclamation and its definition of its geographical limits and upon the
history of the discovery, settlement and establishment of what is now
British Columbia".8 6
Hall, in dissent, claimed that: "Consideration of the issues involves the
study of many historical documents and enactments reviewed in
evidence".87 He then went on to say that: "the Court may take judicial
notice of the facts of history whether past or contemporaneous". He then
asserted for the first time in Canadian law that "the Court is entitled to
rely on its own historical knowledge and researches".88 This clearly takes
83. (1886), 10 O.R. 196. For Judicial Committee judgment, see St. Catharine's Milling and
Lumber Co. v. the Queen (1889), 14 A.C. 46.
84. (1939), S.C.R. 104.
85. (1973), S.C.R. 313.
86. Id, at 323.
87. Id, at 346.
88. Id
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the courts beyond judicial notice. As a preliminary observation to his
dismissal of Chief Justice John Marshall's comments in Johnson v.
Mclntosh 9 (upon which Judson had relied in his judgment), Hall said:
"The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents and
enactments tendered in evidence must be approached in the light of
present-day research and knowledge disregarding ancient concepts
formulated when understanding of the customs and culture of our
original people was rudimentary and incomplete and when they were
thought to be wholly without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect a
subhuman species". 90 This led Hall to dismiss Marshall's judgment in
Johnson v. Mcntosh as "ill-founded".
While Hall makes the distinction between historical evidence and
taking judicial notice, in fact the distinction is unimportant to him. He
accepts historical material as determinative, as the foundation for his legal
judgment. It is more of a tribute to Hall's dissenting judgment in this case
that the Calder case has become so celebrated.
The more recent native claims cases, arising principally in Ontario and
British Columbia, have raised a few of the problems below the surface in
Calder and have prompted serious legal concerns. In the case of Regina
v. Bartlema, 91 a British Columbia Court of Appeal case, Justice Lambert
raised the hackles of many court watchers when he embarked upon his
own archival researches.
Bartleman is a member of the Tsarlip Indian Band, descendants of the
Saanich people who made the North Saanich Treaty with Great Britain
on February 11, 1852. In 1982 he shot and killed a deer and was
promptly charged under the Wildlife Act of British Columbia.
Apparently Bartleman did not know that the property on which he shot
the deer was privately owned or that hunting was prohibited. Bartleman
argued that he was exercising his right to hunt under the 1852 treaty and
that he was exempt from the Wildlife Act by virtue of the Indian Act
Justice Lambert not only took judicial notice of the appropriate
historical facts in this case, he foraged in the archives and history libraries
on his own in order to verify independently evidentiary material
presented at trial. One commentator on the case objected on the grounds
that the "judicial function is not to investigate independently but to judge
the merits of the positions of the parties before the court". 92 This case
confronted even more directly than Calder the limits of the judge's
89. (1823), 8 Wheaton 543,21 U.S. 240.
90. Supra, note 85 at 346.
91. (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 73; 55 B.C.L.R. 78 (B.C.C.A.).
92. M.H. Ogilvie, "Evidence - Judicial Notice - Historical Document and Historical Facts
- Indian Treaty Rights" (1986), 64 Canadian Bar Review 183 at 189.
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function as an independent historical researcher, for in Calder the court
did not undertake independent research. The Bartleman case is important
for the law of evidence because of the precedent-setting conduct of
Lambert. His judgment contained a lengthy section entitled: "Judicial
Notice of Historical Facts". Anticipating critical comments in this
connection, Lambert, J.A. explained: "To the extent that these writings
deal with facts that I was then able to verify independently by examining
the letters and the written component of the treaties, and no further". 93 As
M.H. Ogilvie has related, the weight of authoritative judicial and non-
judicial opinion is against judges presuming to do such things in a trial.94
One of Ogilvie's concerns was that Lambert's independent researches
might tempt him "to read other materials which may influence his
perception of the case". 95
Ogilvie believes that following the leading authorities, judges may with
reason take judicial notice of historical facts. She contends that if
historical material is introduced in evidence, it must be subject to the
rigorous rules of evidence.96
Many of the same issues emerged in a recent Ontario case involving
native land claims. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Bear Island
Foundation (1985),97 the court addressed the problem of unrecorded
history, or oral history. The case, currently on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, is unusual to the extent that it was initiated by the
Crown. The issue is: Did the Crown own some 4,000 square miles of
land in the Lake Nipissing region of Ontario or did a group of Indians
own it by virtue of aboriginal title? The Indians claimed title by virtue of
the Royal Proclamation, 1763, and by aboriginal title at common law.
Mr. Justice Steele, in a lengthy judgment, wrote: "Indian oral history is
admissible in aboriginal land claim cases where their history was never
recorded in writing". The learned judge castigated counsel for the Indians
for not calling as witnesses more Indians who could give oral testimony
to their historic claims. Indeed, Justice Steele, at one point gave the
impression the Indian oral history was to be given special weight. He
wrote: "Facts concerning these matters should be supported by historical,
anthropological or other expert evidence, but the defendants should not
rely entirely on non-Indian historical, anthropological or other evidence
when Indian evidence is available".
93. Supra, note 91 at 82
94. Supra, note 92 at 188-194.
95. Id, at 189.
96. Id, at 197.
97. A.G. for Ontario v. Bear lsland Foundation (1985), 49 O.R. 392.
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Justice Steele ruled that the Indians had a claim to use the land by
virtue of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. He wrote:
I do not accept the defendants' argument that a broad liberal interpretation
of the Royal Proclamation gives the Indians the right to use the lands for
any purpose that they may choose over the succeeding centuries. The
essence of aboriginal rights is the right of Indians to continue to live on
their lands as their forefathers lived. It is nothing more and it is nothing less
than that... I conclude that the royal Proclamation gave to the Indians
only the right to continue using the land for the purposes and in the
manner enjoyed in 1763.98
There are several other cases currently in the judicial pipeline
containing these issues.99 A few will undoubtedly reach the Supreme
Court of Canada in the near future. No one can predict how the Supreme
Court will rule in these cases. There is no doubt, however, that it will
have to confront directly the questions of the use of history in these and
other kinds of cases. Up to this point the Supreme Court has not issued
an authoritative set of guidelines on this important subject.
Vlli Conclusion
The present Supreme Court has confronted the use of history in two
recent cases. In the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act case, 100 Justice
Lamer, after noting that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has extended the scope of constitutional adjudication, reviewed the issue
of history in several earlier Supreme Court cases. He cited the Senate
reference case. The Court ruled in that instance:
It is, we think, proper to consider the historical background which led to
the provision which was made in the Act for the creation of the Senate as
a part of the apparatus for the enactment of federal legislation. In the
debates which occurred at the Quebec Conference in 1864, considerable
time was occupied in discussing provisions respecting the Senate.
Lamer then went on to refer to the late Chief Justice Laskin's use of pre-
Confederation history in the Canadian National Transportation case.102
He concluded that he would follow the same course "when interpreting
the Charter" even to the extent of using the "Minutes of the Proceedings
and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution". But
98. Id
99. For a more complete discussion of Indian land claims and the use of history, see David
R. Williams, "Native Land Claims - Rule of History or Rule of Law?". (A paper presented
at the conference on Law and History, Carleton University, Ottawa, June, 1987).
100. In the Matter of a Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act
101. Re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House Reference (1980), 1 S.C.R.
54.
102. (1983), 2 S.C.R. 206.
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Lamer drew back from using speeches in the legislature or parliament as
authoritative. In this matter he preferred to follow the thinking of Justice
McIntyre in Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act'03
(1984) and Chief Justice Dickson in Reference re Residential Tenancies
Ac4 1979.104
Lamer's final conclusion with respect to the use of the historical record
surrounding the Charter is very cautious. One of the reasons for rejecting
historical materials as authoritative was Lamer's belief that the intention
of the authors of the Charter could not be clearly known. "How can one
say with any confidence that within this enormous multiplicity of actors,
without forgetting the role of the provinces, the comments of a few
federal civil servants can in any way be determinative?" 105
But Lamer's main reason for being bound by the historical materials
was the fear of freezing in time the values contained in the Charter.
"Another danger with casting the interpretation of s.7 in terms of the
comments made by those heard at the Joint Committee Proceedings is
that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodies in the Charter
in effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or
no possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing
societal needs". In other words, the historical record could restrict the
Court in the exercise of its expanded function.
Less than six months later, the Supreme Court once again roamed
throughout legislative history in MacDonald v. The City of Montreal106
Writing for the Court majority (Justice Wilson dissenting), Justice Beetz
reviewed the historical record attending section 133 of the Constitution
Ac4 1867 as had the appellants. But Beetz concluded that the historical
record, far from supporting their positions, squarely contradicted them.
Nothing would tend to illustrate more clearly the dangers of using
historical material. But this did not prevent Beetz from canvassing the
Confederation records for both general and specific assistance. He wrote:
"What this historical record demonstrates is that the Fathers of
Confederation were quite familiar with the old and thorny problem of
language rights ... In a historic constitutional agreement, preceded by
Quebec Resolution 46, which was carefully redrafted several times, the
Fathers of Confederation chose the last mentioned system for judicial
purposes combined with compulsory bilingualism for the purposes of
legislation".1 08
103. (1984), 1 S.C.R. 297
104. (1981), 1 S.C.R. 714 at 721.
105. B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, 26 and 27 (mimeo.).
106. (1986), unreported at the time of writing.
108. Id
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As a general conclusion on the present Supreme Court's attitude
towards the use of history one can say that it stands in contrast to the not-
too-distant past. As Peter Hogg observed ten years ago: "The courts have
generally rejected the 'legislative history' of the British North America Act
as an aid to construction... It is difficult to defend this exclusion". 109 In
the space of a decade, due principally to the Charter's impact, the
Supreme Court of Canada has developed an historical consciousness in
constitutional matters and is likely to continue to do so but not without
some considerable confusion as to what is and is not proper history.
Indeed, there appears to be every reason to believe that history will be
used by Canadian courts. The issue remains, as M.H. Ogilvie has pointed
out, whether those courts should subject the historical evidence to the
normal rules governing evidence. The fear is, however, that history will
enter our jurisprudence by the back door of judicial notice.
109. Supra, note 4 at 97.
